We study the decision entrepreneurs face in …nancing multiple and independent projects. If strategic defaults are assessed likely to occur, for example if judicial e¢ciency is low, entrepreneurs delay projects to seek sequential …nancing from a relationship lender. Such commitment-type borrowing allows the entrepreneur to build a private reputation for repayment and consequently reduces the cost of …nancing. However, if the ex-ante risk of strategic default in the economy is low, the bene…ts of building a private reputation are outweighed by the holdup rents extractable by the incumbent …nancier. In this environment, entrepreneurs choose to …nance all projects at once from single or multiple, arm's-length lenders.
Introduction
Previous theory teaches us that close and repeated …nancing, such as that provided by banks, is most important to so-called "informationally-opaque" borrowers. According to theory, these borrowers -typically small, young …rms with no public track record -value this relationship-based lending because they are unable to credibly communicate their repayment ability to a wider set of "arm's-length" lenders. In reality, many informationallytransparent …rms also rely on some form of relationship-based …nancing. For instance, Houston and James (2000) report that relatively large, publiclytraded …rms obtain an average of 67% of their debt from banks and only 16% from public issues. Ongena and Smith (2000a) show that large, established publicly-traded …rms actually maintain longer bank relationships than small, young publicly-traded …rms. In this paper, we provide a rationale for why all types of …rms may at times prefer relationship-based …nancing. In particular, we study the decision …rms face in …nancing multiple independent investment projects.
In our model, an entrepreneur determines the sequencing for investment in two projects according to the availability and cost of funds. The entrepreneur can either try to …nance both projects up front or sequence the …nancing and investment over two periods. The entrepreneur also decides whether to …nance the projects using one or multiple lenders. A lender bases its …nancing decision on the perceived likelihood that an entrepreneur will strategically default on a loan, and its ability to extract holdup rents. We assume that some entrepreneurs are "good", in that they never default on a loan, while others are "bad" in the sense that they will always default when it pays to do so. Lenders cannot observe an entrepreneur's default type, but know the unconditional likelihood of facing a bad borrower. We show that …rms operating in an environment where strategic defaults are likely choose to have their projects sequentially …nanced by the same lender. We term this behavior "relationship …nancing". The intuition for this result is straightforward. The relationship lender observes individual loan repayments in the …rst period, which increases the ex-ante likelihood of repayment in both periods. The resulting decrease in the interest rate charged to the entrepreneur seeking to …nance the sequenced projects more than o¤sets holdup rents accruing to the incumbent lender.
Our model illustrates that even in cases of severe holdup, relationship …nancing may still be preferable to arm's-length …nancing if the assessed likelihood of repayment is su¢ciently low. However, relationship …nancing is not always optimal. If the ex-ante risk of strategic default in the economy is low, then the bene…ts of building a reputation are outweighed by the holdup rents extractable by the relationship lender. In this environment, …rms choose to …nance both projects upfront either from a single lender or from multiple lenders. We term this, as well as the opportunity to sequence projects using multiple lenders, "arm's-length …nancing".
The main contributions of our paper are two-fold. First, we demonstrate that relationship …nancing can arise endogenously, even when …rms have equal access to arm's-length …nancing and banks are able to extract holdup rents. In our model, all entrepreneurs start with the opportunity for …nanc-ing their projects with arm's length securities and then choose whether or not to invest in a relationship. Second, we link capital budgeting concepts like project timing to …nancing method. Our model provides a rationale for why entrepreneurs may optimally choose to delay …nancing a project even when there is no uncertainty about project payo¤s or discount rates (Dixit and Pindyk, 1994; Berk, 1999), nor a need to monitor progress through stages of …nancing (Gompers, 1995) . Firms sequence projects when reputational gains from paying o¤ early projects reduce future lending costs. Because a reputation for repayment can only be gained by borrowing from the same lender, when …rms choose to sequence projects, they do so through relationship …nancing.
Our theoretical framework also has several more speci…c applications. For instance, our model embodies characteristics of a revolving line of credit. Lines of credit are capped, forcing …rms to repay their drawn credit before …nancing new projects. A pattern of drawdowns and repayments enables a …rm to build a reputation for repayment with its bank. Given this interpretation, our model implies that …rms should opt for lines of credit …nancing with a low credit limit over a large term loan when operating in an environment where strategic default is likely. On the other hand, large term loans should be preferred in settings where strategic default is unlikely. By assigning more meaning to our strategic default parameter, we can also gain insight into cross-sectional di¤erences in …nancing behavior. For instance, if a country's legal system can reduce the incentive for …rms to strategically default, then our model also suggests that relationship …nancing will be more prevalent in countries with weaker contract enforcement and less e¢cient judicial systems. We expand these interpretations later in the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss associations with the related literature in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the model. In Section 4, we explore the characteristics of arm's-length …nancing, while in Section 5 we focus on relationship …nancing. Section 6 describes the possible equilibria and Section 7 introduces extensions to the model. In Section 8, we explore di¤erent applications of the model, and Section 9 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Bank Relationships
Our paper is most closely related to the literature exploring the value of bank relationships. These papers are predicated on the idea that banks, as "inside" lenders, can observe and monitor borrowers in a way that allows them to …-nance …rms that are otherwise unable to obtain valuable …nancing. Banks, it is argued, enjoy scale and scope economies in …nancing such informationallyopaque borrowers, and can therefore improve borrower welfare. 1 However, the ability for a bank to privately observe proprietary information and maintain a close relationship with customers may create a holdup problem, in the sense that the bank can use its information monopoly to extract above cost rents from its good borrowers.
.
We di¤er from this extant literature along several dimensions. First, although information asymmetries exist between lenders and borrowers in our model, the asymmetry itself does not in ‡uence the choice between relationship and arm's length …nancing. Therefore, our model moves away from relating the value of bank …nancing to whether or not a …rm is informationally opaque. Second, rather than assume that …rms require repeated …nancing through time, we allow …rms the choice between repeated lending and one-shot …nancing and derive conditions under which repeated …nanc-ing with one bank is optimal. Third, by assuming that entrepreneurs have multiple projects to …nance, we are able to relate the timing and sequencing of projects to …nancing choice. This provides a novel approach to thinking about some common capital budgeting issues. 1 Fr instance, see Campbell (1979) , Diamond (1984 Diamond ( , 1991 , Fama (1985) , Rajan (1992), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) , Sharpe (1990) , and von Thadden (1995). For formal reviews of this literature, see Boot (2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000b). 2 The holdup problem is explored by Fischer (1990) , Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia (1989), Rajan (1992), Sharpe (1990) , and von Thadden (1998).
Reputation
Because we focus on the in ‡uence of borrower reputation on …nancing choice, our paper also shares similarities with Diamond (1991). In Diamond's model, borrowers always borrow repeatedly, taking into account the impact of current actions on their future reputation, which is publicly observable. In his model, only high-rated borrowers with a good reputation receive arm's-length …nancing. In contrast, in our stylized framework an entrepreneur chooses whether or not to borrow repeatedly depending on the assessed likelihood of repayment to build a privately-observed track record (the repayment history is private information and cannot be reported credibly by an incumbent bank). Hence our setup highlights the trade-o¤ between building a privatelyobservable reputation and an ex post monopoly relationship between the entrepreneur and the bank (rather than a …rm-speci…c track record known to the entire banking sector and perfect competition) to explain the …rm's choice between single-shot arm's-length …nancing and relationship …nancing.
Like our paper, Boot and Thakor (1994) also model repeated borrowing. They show that even without learning or risk aversion, bank-borrower relationships are welfare enhancing and bene…t the borrower. Borrowers in their model commit to a long-term contract that requires paying an above-market borrowing rate and committing collateral until a good project outcome is realized, then paying an in…nite stream of below market rates with no collateral requirements after the realization. Hence in their model durable relationships permit long-term contracting and e¢cient intertemporal taxation and subsidization to reduce the use of costly collateral. In contrast, in our model durable relationships enhance e¢ciency by enabling …nancing of sequenced projects in cases where …nancing of all projects at once can not take place.
Relationship and Arm's-Length Lending
Our modeling is further related to the literature exploring the contrast between relationship and arm's length lending. Rajan (1992) for example argues that relationship lending is bene…cial because a relationship bank's threat to withdraw funding induces …rm managers to accept positive net present value projects. In Boot and Thakor (2000) banks determine the allocation of their lending capacity across relationship and arm's-length or "transaction" lending. Relationship lending is assumed to result in a higher probability of non-zero payo¤s for the borrowers' projects and is further assumed to be increasing in the degree of the banks' sector specialization. Boot and Thakor show that an increase in interbank competition increases relationship lending but decreases the banks' sector specialization, while increased capital market competition reduces relationship lending but increases the banks' sector specialization.
Das and Nanda (1999) also analyze bank specialization by analyzing the trade-o¤ between o¤ering commercial and investment banking services. In their model, commercial banking activities entail long term relationships with ex-post payo¤s for the bank resulting in low levels of bank specialization. Investment banking activities go hand in hand with short term relationships and ex-ante payo¤s causing 'too high' levels of specialization. In contrast to both Boot/Thakor and Das/Nanda, we focus on the entrepreneur's …nanc-ing decision and show that …nancing relationships may arise endogenously, result in a higher probability of repayment, and hence assuage asymmetric information problems.
Project Timing
Because we link project timing to …nancing method, our setup is further related to work focusing on the option value of waiting to invest and optimal contracting under uncertainty. For example, entrepreneurs may optimally choose to delay …nancing a project when there is uncertainty about investment returns or discount rates (Dixit and Pindyk, 1994; Berk, 1999) . Staged …nancing of a single entrepreneurial venture may further be optimal if there is a need to monitor its progress (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers, 1995) .
While Admati and P ‡eiderer (1994) derive the optimality of a …xed-fraction contract under uncertainty in a multistage setting, Bergemann and Hege (1998) show that a time-varying share contract is optimal in a more general, dynamic agency model. The optimality of staging itself and the optimal number of stages is derived in Neher (1999). In his model, staging investment in a single project mitigates the commitment problem of the entrepreneur not to renegotiate down the investor's claim once the investment is sunk.
Complementing these papers, our model considers multiple projects and provides an additional rationale for why entrepreneurs may optimally choose to delay …nancing a project. In our model entrepreneurs sequence projects when reputational gains from paying o¤ early projects reduce future lending costs.
The Model
An entrepreneur has access to two independent projects A and B. Both projects require an initial investment k and yield certain payo¤s ¼ A and ¼ B . Both payo¤s exceed the initial investment k.
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The entrepreneur can either realize both projects simultaneously (henceforth, 'joint projects') or delay one project and in e¤ect pursue the projects sequentially (henceforth, 'sequential projects'). In the latter case the entrepreneur can start with either project A or project B: Without loss of generality, we assume that
To ease notation, let ¢ = 2k=(¼ A + ¼ B ) and ¢ j = k=¼ j , j = A; B, be the inverse pro…tability measures for the joint and sequential projects respectively. Notice that by de…nition
We assume that the entrepreneur has no initial wealth, hence she has to seek outside …nancing from one or two lenders. Each project is nondivisible, so the entrepreneur must borrow the entire amount for a project from one lender. She also has no mechanism for storing excess cash, so that all …nancing must me done just prior to investment. In other words, if the entrepreneur chooses to sequence the projects, she must also sequence her …nancing. Moreover, if the projects are sequenced, the entrepreneur consumes all surplus from the project payo¤ at the end of period 1, such that she …nances the entire period 2 project from outside sources. 4 As part of the …nancing decision, the entrepreneur must also choose whether to borrow from one lender or two. If the borrower chooses to …nance sequential projects from one lender, we label it "relationship …nancing" since the lender learns from the entrepreneur's …rst period behavior. We label as "arm's-length …nanc-ing" the funding of the two projects in one shot in the …rst period (through either one or two lenders) and sequential funding by two di¤erent lenders.
In the beginning of a relationship, the entrepreneur has full bargaining power. However, we assume that the lender acquires full bargaining power in the second period of relationship …nancing. The entrepreneur retains full bargaining power if she switches lenders in the second period. Switching lender does not entail any direct costs, but the new lender does not know the repayment history of the entrepreneur, and the incumbent lender is not able to report it credibly to the new lender.
Lenders are uncertain whether or not repayment, r t ; with t = 1; 2, will occur. With an initial probability p 0 2 (0; 1], the entrepreneur is good, and will always repay any amount up to the project payo¤. With probability 1 ¡ p 0 ; the entrepreneur is bad and has the option to strategically default. She will exercise the option if this is optimal for her to do so. We assume that the lenders cannot recuperate any positive payment when a bad entrepreneur decides to default. Moreover a bad entrepreneur cannot precommit to a positive level of repayment.
The entrepreneur knows her own type, whereas the lenders do not. Initially, the lenders only know the prior probability p 0 : In case the projects are sequenced, the lender that …nances the …rst project also knows whether the entrepreneur pays r 1 . Denote¯2 [0; 1] to be the (endogenously determined) probability that a bad entrepreneur pays r 1 : Given¯; the lender can deduce the total probability q = p 0 +¯(1 ¡ p 0 ) of receiving the payment r 1 : Given that r 1 is paid, the lender updates its prior belief, p 0 ; that the entrepreneur is good using Bayes' rule, i.e. p 1 = p 0 =q:
Both the entrepreneur and the lenders maximize their expected income, with ½ as discount factor of the entrepreneur. In order to facilitate the formal exposition, we assume that ½ > p ¢ B : This assumption requires either that project B be quite pro…table or that the entrepreneur does not discount the future by very much.
This completes the description of the game setup. We proceed as follows. We investigate the cases of arm's length and relationship …nancing separately. We fully describe the equilibrium outcome for each of the two cases. Next we analyze the entrepreneur's choice to sequence projects and to switch lenders after period 1. The lenders anticipating the entrepreneur's choice may structure contracts accordingly.
Arm's Length Financing
If the entrepreneur seeks to …nance joint projects simultaneously, she proposes a contract specifying the investment amount 2k and the repayment level r: Obviously, a bad entrepreneur never repays r as she is always better o¤ repudiating. The good entrepreneur pays minfr; ¼ A + ¼ B g by assumption. The risk of repudiation in ‡uences negotiations at the beginning of the game. A lender anticipates a breach of contract with probability 1¡p 0 : Hence a lender is only willing to sign a contract under which its expected repayment under the best of circumstances p 0 r at least covers investment 2k; i.e. r¸2k=p 0: On the other hand, it is known that any repayment r exceeding ¼ A + ¼ B is impossible since the entrepreneur has no initial wealth, i.e. r ¼ A + ¼ B : The two constraints are compatible if and only if p 0¸2 k=(¼ A + ¼ B ) = ¢: If this is the case, the good entrepreneur o¤ers a repayment r = 2k=p 0 which makes the lender indi¤erent between signing and rejecting and maximizes the entrepreneur's income ¼ A + ¼ B ¡ r. A bad entrepreneur is forced to imitate the behavior of a good entrepreneur. As a bad entrepreneur always wants to default, a rational lender never signs a contract once it is clear the entrepreneur is bad. Aware of this intention, a bad entrepreneur will conceal her intentions in contract negotiations by mimicking the behavior of a good entrepreneur.
Denote°¤ 2 [0; 1] be the probability with which the lender accepts the proposed repayment r. 
The lender rejects if r < 2k=p 0 . On the other hand, the lender accepts if r > 2k=p 0 . For r = 2k=p 0 and p 0 > ¢, the lender accepts with certainty. There is no equilibrium pro…le under which it rejects with positive probability, because the entrepreneur would then propose a repayment r slightly above 2k=p 0 , so that no best response for the lender exists. For r = 2k=p 0 and p 0 = ¢, any°¤ 2 [0; 1] represents a best response for the lender, since the only acceptable repayment leading to a nonnegative income for the entrepreneur is r = 2k=p 0 .
We assumed that the entrepreneur has full bargaining power in both periods under arm's-length …nancing and that the 'repayment history' of the entrepreneur is only known by the …rst lender. It is important to note that, in the second period, the outside lenders cannot learn from the fact that the entrepreneur is seeking …nancing from them. To put it di¤erently, the outside lenders are not exposed to a Winner's Curse problem. The reason for this is that lenders are able to compute a good entrepreneur's optimal choice of …nancing scheme. A bad entrepreneur pursuing a di¤erent strategy than a good entrepreneur is immediately revealed. Therefore, a bad entrepreneur only chooses to switch after period 1 when it is also in the interest of a good entrepreneur to do so. Since the outside lenders do not know the repayment history of the entrepreneur, they expect to be faced with a good entrepreneur with probability p 0 : Therefore, the two periods are structurally identical, and we can directly apply the analysis derived above. The results are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Arm's-Length Financing:
(i) Joint projects: If p 0¸¢ ; the entrepreneur, either good or bad, proposes a repayment r ¤ = 2k=p 0 in exchange for an investment 2k in equilibrium, and the lender accepts. The bad entrepreneur defaults on r with certainty. If p 0 < ¢; no contract is signed.
(ii) Sequential projects: If p 0¸¢j ; j = A; B; the entrepreneur, either good or bad, proposes repayment r ¤ = k=p 0 in exchange for investment k, and the lender accepts. A bad entrepreneur defaults with certainty. If p 0 < ¢ j ; no contract is signed.
The entrepreneur, is able to …nance the sequential projects if and only if p 0¸¢B : For ¢ A p 0 < ¢ B ; she can only …nance the more pro…table project A: In that case, due to discounting, she chooses to realize project A in the …rst period. Also due to discounting and the fact that the repayment is independent from the project choice, she realizes project A before project B: The pro…ts of a good entrepreneur are:
(i) Joint projects:
(ii) Sequential projects:
Comparing pro…ts, it becomes clear that the entrepreneur always chooses to realize both projects jointly if the lender is willing to …nance such engagement. As ¢ < ¢ B , the entrepreneur always undertakes joint projects if the lender is willing to fund. This result is summarized in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 Under arm's-length …nancing, joint projects are realized whenever p 0¸¢ : For ¢ > p 0¸¢A ; only project A is realized in the …rst period, and there is no additional …nancing provided in the second period. For p 0 < ¢ A ; no …nancing takes place at all.
Relationship Financing
The main di¤erence between arm's-length and relationship …nancing is that the repayment behavior of the bad entrepreneur at the end of period 1 will play an important role. As the ensuing analysis will show, there are four types of possible equilibria. We de…ne a 'reputational equilibrium' as a sequential equilibrium in which the bad entrepreneur pays r 1 with probability¯2 (0; 1). In contrast, we de…ne an equilibrium in which the bad entrepreneur always defaults (¯= 0) as a 'separating equilibrium', and an equilibrium in which the bad entrepreneur never defaults (¯= 1) as a 'pooling equilibrium'. Equilibria in which no project is …nanced are labelled 'no investment equilibria'. We solve the model by backwards induction. Applying Proposition 1 to the second period gives us a complete description of the equilibrium in the second period. The bad entrepreneur defaults on r ¤ 2 with certainty. If repayment r 1 has not been paid or p 1 < ¢ j ; no second-period contract is signed.
We now turn to the end of period 1. Suppose project i has been …nanced and realized, and repayment r 1 is due. Anticipating the outcome of the second period (Corollaries 3 and 4), a bad entrepreneur knows that she collects the payo¤ of project j with present value ½¼ j in case she pays r 1 with probability¯such that p 1¸¢j : Obviously, she is better o¤ defaulting when the costs r 1 of 'building up a reputation' exceed the potential gain ½¼ j of having the reputation, i.e. in equilibrium,¯¤ = 0 , r 1 > ½¼ j :
In contrast, for r 1 ½¼ j ; a bad entrepreneur will choose¯as high as possible in order to maximize the probability to collect the reputational rent ½¼ j ¡ r 1 : For p 0¸¢j , she can choose¯= 1 without risking to loose the second-period contract. For p 0 < ¢ j , she can maximally choose:
implying p 1 = ¢ j , and according to Corollary 4,¯¤ =¯successfully induces a second-period contract with probability°¤ 2 [0; 1]. For¯¤ =¯to be an equilibrium, the bad entrepreneur must be indi¤erent between¯¤ and any other¯increasing her reputational rent based on initial beliefs¯¤. 6 Hence in equilibrium, the expected reputational rent°¤½¼ j ¡ r 1 must be equal to zero implying°¤ = r 1 =(½¼ j ). The results are summarized in
Lemma 5
Suppose project i has been …nanced. When repayment r 1 is due and r 1 ½¼ j ; a bad entrepreneur repays with probability¯¤ = minf¯; 1g where¯is given by (2) . For¯¤ =¯< 1, a second-period contract for project j is induced with probability°¤ = r 1 =(½¼ j ). If r 1 > ½¼ j ; a bad entrepreneur defaults, i.e.¯¤ = 0:
The probability q ¤ = p 0 + (1 ¡ p 0 )¯¤ of a repayment in the …rst period is:
and the updated equilibrium beliefs of the lenders about the proportion of good entrepreneurs in case of repayment r 1 has occurred are:
Note that p ¤ 1 is never less than ¢ j : Let us now turn to the contracting problem at the beginning of period 1. Anticipating q ¤ , the lender expects a repayment of q ¤ r 1 : To cover its investment k; it only accepts a contracted repayment equal to:
On the other hand, it also knows that any repayment promise r 1 exceeding ¼ i is impossible as entrepreneurs have no initial wealth, hence:
We now derive conditions for a reputational equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium in which¯¤ 2 (0; 1): According to Lemma 5, a positive repayment probability less than 1 implies¯¤ =¯and is only possible if the reputational rent is nonnegative, hence:
and if the choice of¯¤ matters, p 0 < ¢ j . Taking (3) into account, inequalities (5), (6) and (7) are compatible if and only if:
implying:
Combined with p 0 < ¢ j , the former condition implies k < ½¼ j : Suppose all conditions stated so far are ful…lled. Then, if the good entrepreneur chooses a contract promising a repayment r 1 satisfying (8), she will choose r 1 as low as possible in order to maximize her income. Hence she proposes:
A bad entrepreneur is forced to mimic the good type as any other proposal would reveal her true type. In the Appendix, it is shown that proposing a contract promising r ¤ 1 in exchange for investment k actually maximizes the good entrepreneur's income. Hence we arrive at a Lemma detailing the Reputational Equilibrium. (5), (6), (7), and taking (3) into account, we arrive at minf¼ i ; ½¼ j g¸r 1¸k , which is only possible if k ½¼ j .
If k ½¼ j and p 0¸¢j are satis…ed, and if the good entrepreneur chooses a contract promising a repayment r 1 within the interval [k; minf¼ i ; ½¼ j g]; she will choose r 1 as low as possible in order to maximize her income. Hence she proposes r ¤ 1 = k: Again, a bad entrepreneur is forced to mimic the good type to prevent detection. In the Appendix, we show that proposing a contract promising r ¤ 1 actually maximizes the good entrepreneur's income. Lemma 7 Pooling Equilibrium: Suppose k ½¼ j and p 0¸¢j : Then there exists a unique pooling equilibrium in which the entrepreneur, whether good or bad, proposes a contract promising repayment r ¤ 1 = k in exchange for investment k in the …rst period, and the lender accepts. At the end of period 1, the bad entrepreneur repays with certainty.
Next we derive conditions for a separating equilibrium to exist (¯¤ = 0): According to Lemma 5, a repayment probability¯¤ = 0 is only possible if the reputational rent is negative (r 1 > ½¼ j ): Recalling inequalities (5), (6) , and taking (3) into account, r 1 must also satisfy ¼ i¸r1¸k =p 0 ; implying p 0¸¢i : To analyze this con…guration, we consider the following two cases: k > ½¼ j and k ½¼ j .
Suppose p 0¸¢i and k > ½¼ j : According to Lemma 5 and inequality (5), a bad entrepreneur will never repay r 1 since r 1¸k =q ¤¸k > ½¼ j : Hence r 1 must be at least k=p 0 : If the good entrepreneur is to choose a contract promising repayment r 1¸k =p 0 ; she will choose r 1 as low as possible in order to maximize her income. She proposes r ¤ 1 = k=p 0 ; and the bad entrepreneur is forced to mimic the good type. Now suppose p 0¸¢i and k ½¼ j : From Lemmata 6 and 7 we know that the good entrepreneur prefers to propose a repayment r ¤ 1 = k maxf¢ j =p 0 ; 1g as long as p 0¸m axf¢ A ¢ B ; ¢ 2 j =½g: Hence a separating equilibrium only exists if maxf¢ A ¢ B ; ¢ 2 j =½g > p 0¸¢i : This is possible for ¢ 2 j =½ > p 0¸¢i : If that is the case, the good entrepreneur will propose r ¤ 1 = k=p 0 in order to maximize her income, and the bad entrepreneur mimics this behavior.
Taking the Appendix into account, where we show that proposing r ¤ 1 = k=p 0 actually maximizes the good entrepreneur's income in both cases, we end up with a Lemma describing the Separating Equilibrium.
Lemma 8 Separating Equilibrium: Suppose (i) k > ½¼ j and p 0¸¢j ; or (ii) k ½¼ j and ¢ 2 j =½ > p 0¸¢i : Then there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which the entrepreneur, whether good or bad, proposes a contract promising repayment r ¤ 1 = k=p 0 in exchange for investment k in the …rst period, and the lender accepts. At the end of period 1, the bad entrepreneur defaults with certainty.
To complete the analysis, we need to state the conditions under which a equilibrium with no investment exists. This is done by summarizing the logical counter-arguments of Lemmata 6, 7, and 8. Decreasing ¼ A while holding ¼ B …x has the e¤ect that ¢ A gets larger than ¢ 2 B =½: Therefore, there is no more room for a Separating Equilibrium. This 7 Relaxing the assumption on the discount factor does not a¤ect the results qualitatively.
is shown in Figures 1 (ii) and (iii). The di¤erence between the two …gures has no in ‡uence for sequence fA; Bg:
Looking at project sequence fB; Ag; one notices the absence of a Separating Equilibrium. Due to the assumption ¼ A > ¼ B ; the second period project A is attractive enough for the bad entrepreneur wishing to get …nanced. For the same reason, equilibria exist for lower ranges of p 0 than for the project sequence fA; Bg: The next Lemma 10 summarizes these results. From Lemma 10 follows that the good entrepreneur will choose project sequence fB; Ag; whenever p 0 is too low to allow for …nancing using project sequence fA; Bg: For higher values of p 0 ; we have to compare the pro…ts for the good entrepreneur in order to know which project sequence is chosen in equilibrium. For project sequence fi; jg; the pro…ts are given by
Comparing these payo¤s allows us to formulate Lemma 11. We relegate the proof of Lemma 11 to the Appendix. Combining Lemmata 6 to 11 allows us to fully describe the equilibrium for relationship …nancing.
Proposition 12 Relationship Financing
there is a Reputational Equilibrium with project sequence fB; Ag for ¢ A ¢ B p 0 < ¢ A ; there is a Pooling Equilibrium with project sequence fB; Ag for ¢ A p 0 < k=(¼ A ¡ ¼ B + k); there is a Separating Equilibrium with project sequence fA; Bg for k=(
there is a Reputational Equilibrium with project sequence fA; Bg for ¢ 
Choice of Financing Method
Arm's-length …nancing occurs when either (i) both projects are realized at once, or (ii) the entrepreneur sequences projects and switches to another lender at the end of the …rst period. Relationship …nancing is characterized by sequencing projects but no switching of lender. We assume that under arm's-length …nancing the entrepreneur retains full bargaining power in the second period, while under relationship …nancing the lender obtains full bargaining power in the second period. Clearly, the entrepreneur switches lender whenever the second period's pro…t is positive, and an outside lender is willing to …nance the second period project. Applying Proposition 1 (ii) shows that outside lenders are willing to …nance project i whenever p 0¸¢i and that in this case the entrepreneur's pro…t is nonnegative.
Suppose that project A has been realized in period one. The entrepreneur gets project B …nanced from an outside lender whenever p 0¸¢B : We know from Corollary 2, that the entrepreneur does not sequence projects whenever p 0¸¢ : Therefore, since ¢ B > ¢; for p 0¸¢B ; undertaking both projects jointly strictly dominates sequencing fA; Bg. Similarly suppose now that project B has been realized in period one. The entrepreneur switches whenever p 0¸¢A : Then, …nancing project B in the …rst period only takes place if p 0¸¢B : If p 0¸¢B , however, it follows from Corollary 2 that the entrepreneur does not sequence the projects. Summarizing, we …nd that the entrepreneur never switches lender, since, whenever it would be pro…table for her to do so, it is even more pro…table not to sequence the projects in the …rst place.
This limits the analysis of the entrepreneur's choice between …nancing joint and sequential projects. In case the entrepreneur sequences projects, she also has to decide project sequence. From Proposition 1 (i) follows that joint projects can be …nanced if p 0¸¢ : Therefore, for p 0 < ¢, Proposition 12 applies. As already shown, relationship …nancing is not feasible for p 0¸¢B ; since then the entrepreneur would switch the lender after period one. For ¢ p 0 < ¢ B ; we have to compare the entrepreneur's pro…ts. From ¢ > k=(¼ A ¡ ¼ B + k) and Lemma 11 follows that the good entrepreneur chooses fA; Bg if she chooses relationship …nancing. From Lemma 7 we know that for relationship …nancing we only need to look at the pro…ts for a Separating and a Reputational Equilibrium. Therefore, we have to compare the pro…ts of the entrepreneur for a Separating and a Reputational Equilibrium with project sequence fA; Bg under relationship …nancing and the pro…t under arm's length …nancing with joint projects. It turns out that the entrepreneur always chooses relationship …nancing.
Lemma 13 For ¢ p 0 < ¢ B ; the entrepreneur sequences projects.
From Lemma 6 follows that a reputational equilibrium only exists if p 0 < ¢ B : Combining the two inequalities leads to ¢ B¸1 ; a contradiction. Proposition 14 summarizes the main result. This we …nd an interesting and straightforward result. Although the entrepreneur would be able to …nance the projects jointly, for intermediate values of p 0 ; she chooses to sequence and to accept that the lender will collect the entire second period surplus. The reason is that under joint project …nancing, the repayment r = 2k=p 0 rises quicker with a decreasing p 0 than for sequential project …nancing and a Reputational Equilibrium where r 1 + r 2 = k¢ B =p 0 + ¼ B ; or a Separating Equilibrium where r 1 + r 2 = k=p 0 + ¼ B . Since relationship …nancing only exists for relatively low values of p 0 , this e¤ect is strong and compensates more than adequately for the loss of the entire second period payo¤.
Proposition 14

Extensions
Our stylized model shows that if the lender assesses repayment to be unlikely, an entrepreneur will defer a project and borrow repeatedly from the same lender in order to build a reputation for repayment. Such relationship …nancing is chosen, even in the presence of holdup. If the likelihood of repayment becomes really low, the entrepreneur may even reverse project order, exacerbating holdup costs.
To illustrate the main ingredient of the model further, assume an entrepreneur has access to exactly one project in each period and hence cannot decide to delay a project. In that case the entrepreneur picks ordering fA; Bg. If p 0¸¢B > ¢ A , she switches lender and the bad entrepreneur can default both in the …rst and second period. If p 0 < ¢ B , the entrepreneur does not swap lender and the bad entrepreneur repays with probability¯¤ < 1. Alignment fB; Ag may not be chosen. If p 0¸¢A , new lenders always provide funds implying that switching is optimal. Consequently, lenders in the …rst period only fund project B if p 0¸¢B . Now, introduce immediate access to both projects including the option to delay. If p 0¸¢B , good entrepreneurs tackle both projects such that bad entrepreneurs never get the switching option. In general and even in the case of …xed project alignment (but retaining free project access), showing up in the second period as a new customer exposes the entrepreneur as being bad. Hence sequencing projects and relationship …nance go hand-in-hand in our model. This main result is robust to various model alterations and extensions. Consider for example the case of endogenous project split up. Let ¼ A + ¼ B = C; a constant, and assume that the entrepreneur …xes project size by determining the proportion ® of C to be allocated to project A and the proportion (1 ¡ ®) allocated to project B. We have to consider only the representative project sequence fB; Ag. For this project sequence; p 0m
A =½g is a necessary condition for a Reputational Equilibrium to exist. In case of endogenous project split the latter condition changes to
is minimized for ® = 1=2; and increases in ® for ® > 1=2:
is the relevant condition (see Figure 1 (iii)), and
Hence by increasing ®, that is by placing more weight on the second-period project, the entrepreneur is able to broaden the range of p 0 for which …nancing is feasible. The maximum she can attain is to set ® = ® = 1=(1 + ½). Increasing ® beyond ® makes k 2 =(®(1 ¡ ®)C 2 ) the relevant condition, which, as mentioned before, increases in ®. To conclude, endogenous project split up and an increase in total project payo¤s (C ) widens the reach of both arm's-length and relationship …nancing versus the No Investment outcome.
However, arms'-length …nancing may become less prevalent, if the size of the investment in the joint projects exceeds the credit limit set for the entrepreneur by each lender and, in addition, if the entrepreneur incurs a …xed cost when approaching a second lender. Credit limits could be the result of small bank size and corresponding lack of diversi…cation, and may be self-imposed or a result of regulation.
On the other hand, introducing a …xed cost to sequencing projects may make relationship …nancing less attractive. For example, sequencing product development and generating a payo¤ on a partly …nished product to repay a loan may at best be suboptimal. Revolving …nance of retail inventories may be easier to accomplish. A reduction in the discount rate (i.e., an increase in the discount factor ½) similarly makes project deferral less costly and increases the reach of relationship …nancing versus the No Investment area. Increased bank fragility, i.e. the expectation that the relationship bank may not be around in later periods, may make arm's-length …nancing more attractive.
The main intuition of the model also remains broadly intact in generalizations to multiple projects and/or multiple periods. Enabling the entrepreneur and the …nanciers to write long-term contracts similarly does not alter the results. We so far implicitly assumed that the entrepreneur is not able to credibly commit to stay with the incumbent …nancier. The threat of switching in the second period disappears if she is able to commit. Hence it is possible that the entrepreneur prefers relationship …nancing for p 0¸¢B : In order to check for this possibility, we compare pro…ts for a Pooling Equilibrium for fA; Bg with the pro…ts for arm's-length …nancing of the joint projects. As ¦ ALF > ¦ RF (P E; fA; Bg), 8 we can conclude that the writing of long-term contracts does not alter our results.
On the other hand, introducing second period …nancing by retained earnings impedes the existence of a Reputational Equilibrium because the value of built-up reputation decreases. However, if the initial proportion of good debtors is too low to establish a Reputational Equilibrium, the good debtor could o¤er a contract to the second-period lender at the beginning of the …rst period. The contract should specify the investment and a condition that the project will proceed only in case the …rst-period lender is repaid. The introduction of such contract re-establishes the Reputational Equilibrium because the bad entrepreneur is once again forced to imitate the good debtor by proposing a similar contract.
Applications
Loan Commitments
Because of the similarity between relationship lending in our model and a bank line of credit, our paper is closely related to the literature analyzing the optimality of loan commitment lending. 9 According to this literature, loan commitments are mechanisms designed to optimally balance reputational and …nancial capital, to forecast future loan demand, to lower regulatory taxes, or to exploit cost advantages in providing liquidity. Commitments can further mitigate investment distortions and suboptimal liquidation problems, enable borrowers to signal unobservable characteristics, and function as insurance contracts to risk-averse borrowers.
Complementing this literature, our model aims to demonstrate why it may be optimal to have repeated borrowing instead of one-shot …nancing. We do so by formally showing that a …rm may opt for project delay to allow the bank to learn from observing both drawdowns and repayments. The ensuing but voluntary exposure to the bank's scrutiny may render better contract terms for the entrepreneur, even in the presence of anticipated holdup.
Contract Enforcement
Recent empirical work documents a strong positive correspondence between judicial e¢ciency, development of …nancial intermediation, and ultimately economic growth. For example, Levine (1999) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) show that cross-country di¤erences in creditor rights, the quality of contract enforcement, and accounting standards help explain cross-country di¤erences in …nancial intermediary development. 10 The component of …nan-cial development determined by the legal and regulatory environment in turn helps account for cross-country di¤erences in economic growth. In particular, these studies document a strong positive association between proxies for the quality of contract enforcement in a country and the overall size of the …nancial intermediary sector. Our model illustrates this positive association.
In our setup only bad entrepreneurs have the option not to repay. This proportion of bad entrepreneurs may in reality directly stem from the quality of the available contract enforcement mechanism. Stringent contract enforcement leaves few entrepreneurs with the strategic option to default. Lax enforcement, on the other hand, creates opportunities for many entrepreneurs never to repay. or in general have enough legal skills and resources to elude, delay, and ultimately derail any weak attempts at judicial enforcement. Lenders may not know ex-ante whether or not an entrepreneur has access to such skills and resources.
Judicial E¢ciency
A more general interpretation of the likelihood of repayment as a function of judicial e¢ciency may also be fruitful. Relationship banking may thrive in countries where the judicial system is weaker in apprehending and removing 'swindlers' from the credit market. Swindlers don't simply 'work' a legal system to avoid repayment. Swindlers are crooks and thieves, they never repay, they disappear, are unable, or simply refuse to repay even under legal duress and in jail. 12 Banks may assess pools of entrepreneurs in countries with weaker judicial systems to contain a high percentage of such risky, i.e. non-repaying, borrowers. Residing in such a country, entrepreneurs may do better delaying projects and seeking relationship-type …nancing.
Our stylized model not only links contract enforcement and judicial e¢-ciency with decisions about project sequencing, but ultimately also with the development of the …nancial intermediary sector and the level of investment. Indeed, when the judicial system is e¢cient, entrepreneurs will immediately undertake all accessible projects and engage in arm's-length borrowing. An ine¢cient judicial system on the other hand impels entrepreneurs to delay projects to build a reputation for repayment. As a result, judicial ine¢ciency may hamper current investment and reduces contemporaneous demand for funding as entrepreneurs choose for relationship …nancing. 13 Hence we identify project delay to build a private reputation for repayment as an endogeCountry Risk Guide), or (3) an average of the latter two measures. 1 2 In Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) all entrepreneurs are bad but the …nancier can promise a second-period loan in case the entrepreneur repays at the end of …rst period. The second-period losses are then outweighed by the …rst-period pro…ts. In our model, we have both good and bad entrepreneurs and contracts in both periods have to be pro…table for the …nancier. 1 3 Our framework may complement recent static models by, for example, Fabbri (2000) and Iacovoni and Zazzaro (2000) . Fabbri assumes that weak contract enforcement increases the cost of repossessing collateral in case of default, while Iacovoni and Zazzaro postulate that legal ine¢ciencies increase the banks' screening and monitoring costs. Both papers arrive, like ours, at demonstrating a positive link between the quality of contract enforcement and investment. nously arising, 'insidious' cost of judicial ine¢ciency.
Conclusion
To conclude, the model suggests that repeated funding of sequential projects may arise as the dominant form of …nance when many entrepreneurs are expected not to repay. This may be the case when the quality of contract enforcement or judicial e¢ciency is poor. In that case, many entrepreneurs can get away with and may decide not to repay and building a reputation for repayment constitutes a costly substitute for contract enforcement. To build a reputation, good entrepreneurs will delay projects to seek repeated …nance from the same bank. Hence a low ex-ante likelihood of repayment may go hand-in-hand with project delay, reduced current investment, and possibly a smaller relationship-oriented …nancial sector. On the other hand, a larger arm's-length oriented …nancial sector will facilitate investment if the ex-ante likelihood of repayment is high.
While our stylized framework links judicial e¢ciency and the prevailing type of …nancing, it remains silent on the precise linkage between judicial e¢-ciency and the number of …nancing relationships. For example, Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000c) document a negative correspondence between di¤erent proxies for judicial e¢ciency and the occurrence of multiple bank-…rm relationships in samples containing Italian and large European …rms respectively. Their results may suggest that in regions where judicial e¢ciency is poor, relationship …nancing forces project delay, in e¤ect reducing per period funding and worsening holdup. Multiple bank arrangements may then arise to increase per period access to funding and to abate holdup. On the other hand, in regions where judicial e¢ciency is high, …rms can immediately …nance all currently accessible projects possibly using a single lender. Such arm's-length …nancing is further untainted by holdup, even when …rms would borrow repeatedly from the same bank. However, we leave investigating these conjectures for future research. 
; repayment r ¤ 1 = k¢ B =p 0 satis…es the relevant rationality constraints (5), (6) and (7). To complete the proof, we show that promising repayment r ¤ 1 maximizes the good entrepreneur's income. Recalling Corollary 4, the good entrepreneur's income P ¤ g under r ¤ 1 over both periods is given by
Note that given the assumptions made on p 0 ; income P ¤ g is nonnegative.
Step 1: Consider any repayment r o 1 an lender is not willing to sign. Then, according to Corollary 3, a contract over project A promising repayment r 
Proof of Lemma 7
The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 6. We showed in the text that given k ½¼ B and p 0¸¢B ; repayment r ¤ 1 = k satis…es the relevant rationality constraints. To complete the proof, we show that promising repayment r Step 2: Any repayment promise r o 1 < k violates the lenders' rationality constraints (5) . Hence the lenders reject, and we are back at Step 1.
Step 3: Consider any repayment r 
Proof of Lemma 8
We showed in the text that given (i) k > ½¼ B and p 0¸¢A ; or (ii) k ½¼ B and ¢ It remains to show that proposing r ¤ 1 = k=p 0 dominates the strategy to sign no contract in the …rst period and, according to Corollary 3, a contract with repayment r ¤ 2 = k=p 0 in the second period. Following the latter strategy, the entrepreneur achieves an income with present value ½(¼ A ¡ k=p 0 ); which is less than income P ¤ g :
Proof of Lemma 11
² ¦ RF (P E; fA; Bg) > ¦ RF (P E; fB; Ag) since ¼ A > ¼ B :
² ¦ RF (RE; fA; Bg)¸¦ RF (RE; fB; Ag) for p 0¸¢A ¢ B ; which, for a RE, is always given. ² All other combinations are irrelevant; see Figure 1 .
